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Abstract
Objectives: Our aim was to identify the factors influencing the selection of a model of acute stroke service central-
ization to create fewer high-volume specialist units in two metropolitan areas of England (London and Greater
Manchester). It considers the reasons why services were more fully centralized in London than in Greater Manchester.
Methods: In both areas, we analysed 316 documents and conducted 45 interviews with people leading transformation,
service user organizations, providers and commissioners. Inductive and deductive analyses were used to compare the
processes underpinning change in each area, with reference to propositions for achieving major system change taken
from a realist review of the existing literature (the Best framework), which we critique and develop further.
Results: In London, system leadership was used to overcome resistance to centralization and align stakeholders
to implement a centralized service model. In Greater Manchester, programme leaders relied on achieving change by
consensus and, lacking decision-making authority over providers, accommodated rather than challenged resistance by
implementing a less radical transformation of services.
Conclusions: A combination of system (top-down) and distributed (bottom-up) leadership is important in enabling
change. System leadership provides the political authority required to coordinate stakeholders and to capitalize on
clinical leadership by aligning it with transformation goals. Policy makers should examine how the structures of system
authority, with performance management and financial levers, can be employed to coordinate transformation by aligning
the disparate interests of providers and commissioners.
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Introduction
Major system change in healthcare involves ‘interven-
tions aimed at coordinated, system wide change aﬀect-
ing multiple organizations and care providers’.1 There
is interest internationally in this approach for improv-
ing outcomes and reducing costs but limited evidence
on achieving it.2 A realist review of the literature
(the Best framework) identiﬁed ﬁve rules for enhancing
implementation.1 These link success to social
processes (collective actions of human actors) enabling
multiple forms of leadership, learning from history,
improvement through feedback, physician engagement
and service user involvement. By applying the Best
framework, we aimed to understand the processes
of planning and implementing two cases of major
system change and, in so doing, critique and develop
the framework.
We draw on a mixed methods evaluation of the
centralization of acute stroke services to create fewer
high-volume specialist services in two English metro-
politan areas,3 London (population 8.17 million)
and Greater Manchester (hereafter referred to as
Manchester) (population 2.68 million).4 To give an
indication of the scale of the changes, within two
years of their implementation, over 8000 stroke patients
were admitted to acute services in Manchester and
15,000 in London.5 However, the outcomes of centra-
lizing services diﬀered. Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences ana-
lysis showed that centralizing stroke services in
London reduced mortality and length of stay, while in
Manchester length of stay in hospital fell but there was
no impact on mortality beyond that which occurred in
the rest of England.5 Through qualitative analysis of
stakeholder interviews and documentary evidence, our
aim was to explain why diﬀerent models were imple-
mented in two areas and in doing so, enhance the Best
framework for future use.
Major system change of stroke services
Proposals to transform acute stroke services in London
and Manchester were based on evidence that people
with suspected stroke should be admitted to a specialist
acute stroke unit to get rapid access to brain imaging
and anticoagulant drugs,6 and were informed by exam-
ples of specialist units in Australia7 and coordinated
services in Canada.8 A national stroke strategy recom-
mended ‘hub-and-spoke’ service models for large
metropolitan areas, with specialist ‘hubs’ providing
urgent care and ‘spoke’ units providing further care
closer to patients’ homes.9 In Manchester, the case
for centralizing services was made locally by health
professionals to commissioning and provider leads.
In London, centralizing acute stroke services was rec-
ommended as part of a review of services.10 In both
areas, the process of centralization was characterized
by overlapping phases of planning and development,
consultation and implementation (Figures 1 and 2).
In London, the previous system for delivering acute
stroke services involved 32 providers and the local
ambulance service. In Manchester, nine providers and
the ambulance service were involved. In both areas, a
stroke project board (including providers, commis-
sioners and patient representatives) was established to
develop new service models and manage implemen-
tation. Change was governed using a ‘top-down’
approach in London, led by the pan-regional health
authority (Figure 1), while a more ‘bottom-up’ net-
work-based approach was used in Manchester, led by
local providers and commissioners (Figure 2).
Informed by the external advisory group’s recommen-
dations, commissioners in Manchester initially chose a
service model in which all patients presenting at hospital
within 24h of onset of stroke symptoms would be trea-
ted in one of three Hyper Acute Stroke Units (HASUs);
post hyper-acute care would be delivered by ten local
Stroke Units (SUs). Shortly before implementation,
some hospitals raised concerns about the impact of cen-
tralization on hospital resources and patient safety such
as repatriation of frail and elderly patients.
Consequently, the model was revised: only patients pre-
senting at hospital within four hours of stroke symptoms
appearing would be admitted to a HASU; all others
would be taken as before to the nearest SU. Acute
stroke services were not entirely withdrawn from any
hospital. In London, the project board’s clinical sub-
group recommended 10–12 HASUs but the project
board proposed 8, reﬂecting the earlier review’s recom-
mendations. Subsequently, 24 providers became SUs
and stroke services were withdrawn from ﬁve hospitals.
Our aim in this paper is to determine why diﬀerent
models for centralizing services were chosen in London
and Manchester and assess how the two diﬀerent
approaches contributed to diﬀerent centralization
models being implemented.
Methods
To analyse change in both areas, we conducted 45 semi-
structured stakeholder interviews and analysed 316
documents. Using documentary evidence and snowball
sampling, we identiﬁed stakeholders involved in gov-
erning the transformations (Table 1). The interviews
lasted approximately 45 min and were audio-recorded.
Interview topic guides covered governance approaches,
proposal development, model agreement and imple-
mentation. Documentary evidence was used to develop
narratives of the transformations, such as public con-
sultation arrangements. The changes to services were
implemented in 2010, and the interviews were
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conducted during 2012 and 2013. They represent a
retrospective account when respondents were aware of
how the services were performing. This use of diﬀerent
types of evidence,11 mitigated the risk of bias due to
length of time since interviews.
Analysis of the interviews and documents was induct-
ive and deductive,12 as coding was informed by themes
emerging from the empirical data and a realist review of
major system change literature.1 Data relating to
London and Manchester were initially coded separately
to produce narratives of transformation. Change across
the two areas was compared using cross-cutting themes
from the narratives, including receptivity to change,
stakeholder involvement and experiences of service
transformation. Finally, the coded data were analysed
using Best’s ﬁve rules to comparemechanisms inﬂuencing
major system change. The research team met regularly to
discuss and agree interpretations of the data and identify
questions for further exploration. To enhance validity,
emerging ﬁndings were shared with relevant stakeholders
from the two study areas, including professionals and
service user representatives.
Results
The approaches to change are assessed by applying the
ﬁve rules from the Best framework, including analysis
of where the rules need to be adapted based on our
ﬁndings (Table 2).
Rule 1: Combining designated and
distributed leadership
This highlights the importance of combining desig-
nated leadership with distributed responsibility for
improvement. In Manchester, the leadership of
change was mainly distributed, while in London dis-
tributed and designated leadership were combined.
This meant that when there was resistance to centraliz-
ing services from some stakeholders in both areas,
there was a lack of system leadership in Manchester
to challenge resistance and align stakeholders. As
Figure 2 shows, the pan-regional health authority
was not directly involved in the programme resulting
in a less radical transformation of services in
Manchester relative to London.
Figure 1. Governance arrangements for centralizing acute stroke services in London.
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Distributed leadership. In both areas, reorganizing stroke
services was supported by many clinicians because it
was an opportunity for service investment and to gain
further recognition as a profession distinct from geriat-
ric medicine: ‘[clinicians] felt that stroke was a sort of a
Cinderella service, that very little investment had been
made in stroke. They saw that additional money was
coming’ (Stroke network board member). Local clinical
leaders’ endorsement of centralization generated wider
support. In Manchester, change leaders used
distributed leadership in relying on stroke physicians
convincing others that centralization was necessary:
‘a lot of it was around peer support and, whether they
liked it or not, those antagonists respected some of the
lead stroke clinicians that were there around the table’
(Stroke network board member). While clinical leader-
ship was visible in both areas, there were diﬀerences in
designated leadership and how this was used to capit-
alize on distributed leadership.
Designated leadership. In London, designated leadership
was easier to exercise than in Manchester because pro-
gramme leaders possessed greater political authority to
manage stakeholders’ resistance to change. Programme
leaders were members of the pan-regional authority
which oversaw changes to stroke services as part of a
wider review of health services (Figure 1). This
Figure 2. Governance arrangements for centralizing acute stroke services in Greater Manchester.
Table 1. Profile of interviewees in London and Manchester.
Interviewees London Manchester National Total
Stroke network board 5 6 – 11
Pan-regional health
authority
7 – – 7
Service commissioners 3 1 – 4
Service users or
representatives
3 3 – 6
Programme facilitation 2 1 – 3
Clinical leads 2 1 – 3
Provider organizations 2 1 – 3
Stroke services’ staff – 3 – 3
Ambulance service 1 1 – 2
Politicians 1 – 2 3
Total 26 17 2 45
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structure ensured that the model proposed by the pro-
ject board for centralizing services was implemented:
‘you are the priesthood if you like of the model, so you
keep the ﬁdelity to the model that’s being described and
only with your ‘say so’ can people deviate from it’ (pan-
regional health authority member).
Planning was shaped by the pan-regional health
authority because change was informed by a wider
review10 of stroke and other services that had political
inﬂuence because it was clinically led and demonstrated
public support. Selection criteria for HASUs included
strategic coherence13 with wider plans to develop major
acute hospitals in London with other specialist services
(major trauma care) and to ensure patients could reach
a HASU by ambulance within 30 min. As clinical rec-
ommendations concerning designation were considered
Table 2. Summary analysis of Best et al.’s1 framework applied to major system change (MSC) of acute stroke services in London and
Greater Manchester.
London Greater Manchester Adapted rule
Combine designated and
distributed leadership
Centralizing services, and
opportunity for investment,
endorsed by clinical leaders,
despite risk of losing services.
Pan-regional authority over-
saw change and helped to
align stakeholders.
Impetus for centralizing services
came from senior stroke
physicians and public health
staff; encouraged others to
support change. Change led
by local stroke network which
did not have formal authority
over providers.
Interplay between bottom-up
and top-down leadership in
achieving MSC; system-wide
authority is needed to align
multiple stakeholders over a
large scale and encourage
clinical commitment to
system-wide improvement
goals.
Feedback loops Clinicians involved in developing
quality standards for new
services, as well as commis-
sioners and providers’ finance
teams. Providers received
financial incentive for meeting
standards. Stroke network
advised providers on meeting
standards.
Providers compensated for
collecting and sharing national
audit data, but no financial
incentive for meeting clinical
standards. Clinicians and
managers from different
providers along patient
pathway met regularly to
review performance.
Feedback may need to be com-
bined with other tools to
encourage behaviour change,
e.g. financial incentives.
Attend to history Awareness from previous
attempts to transform
services across London that
implementing change is
challenging. Legal firm
consulted to avoid subsequent
challenges.
Drew on experience from
members of stroke network
involved in an earlier
reorganization of acute
cardiac services.
Contextual factors can be a bar-
rier to implementing lessons
learned; political authority
may be needed to challenge
the existing context and
enable more radical forms of
transformation.
Engage physicians Engaging variety of health
professionals important in
planning new services,
especially ambulance service.
Need to engage stakeholders
outside health service; resist-
ance from local politicians to
closure of services.
Many stroke physicians sup-
ported change; some resist-
ance from providers set to
lose services. Need to engage
other stakeholders, e.g. hos-
pital managers as model had
to be viable as ‘business
proposal’.
Need to involve a range of
stakeholders in planning MSC
and have a system-wide gov-
ernance structure to align
their interests.
Involve patients
and families
Proposal for centralizing stroke
care put to public consult-
ation. Quantified support for
proposal used to legitimize
centralization of services.
Perceived perspective of patients
used to steer negotiations
among providers and com-
missioners towards consen-
sus. Some suggested that
views of public and patients
had limited influence on
model of services.
Awareness that the drivers of
MSC (e.g. clinical, political,
social, financial) influence how
different stakeholders’ views
come to count during imple-
mentation; potential tension
between patients’ and others’
perspectives.
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alongside hospitals’ ﬁt with these broader criteria, some
perceived that a ‘top-down’ approach to decision-
making was taken: ‘giving them the model, saying this
is what we want to do, and then there was a discussion
about it, rather than it coming from the grass roots up’
(stroke network board member).
In Manchester, transformation was led by the stroke
network board (Figure 2). As programme leaders
lacked formal authority over providers and commis-
sioners, changes were planned by consensus. As
described earlier, a late challenge to the 24-h model
came from some hospitals that were set to lose activity
in the proposed changes to stroke services. In order to
maintain unanimity, programme leaders implemented a
4-h model: ‘the minute it felt like unanimity was being
compromised on that clinical discussion on the 24 versus
the 4-hour pathway I think we were always going to be
minded then to tilt towards holding unanimity’ (service
commissioner).
Interplay between designated and distributed leadership.
Designated leadership encouraged further distributed
leadership of the changes proposed. In London, desig-
nated leadership was used to encourage stakeholders to
associate with a wider geography of improvement:
My key mantra at the moment is to remind people
constantly that this is the London model. So when an
organisation says that they’d like to change something
[. . .] we say you can’t do that without it impacting on
the whole of London (Stroke network member).
Further support for centralization was garnered
through pan-London events during the public consult-
ation, the second phase of the programme shown in
Figure 1. Instead of a formal public consultation,
Manchester held two consensus-building events
involving providers, commissioners and the public
where proposals for transformation were discussed
(Figure 2).
Reﬂecting on the comparative diﬃculty of centraliz-
ing services in Manchester, one programme leader sug-
gested that greater authority would have been useful in
ensuring diﬀerent stakeholders prioritized the wider
metropolitan area’s interests: ‘one of the things that we
would do now that we didn’t do then would be probably
not proceed on the base of unanimity’ and instead ensure
‘people wear a kind of ‘‘Greater Manchester population’’
hat’ (service commissioner).
In London, while change was more ‘top-down’ than
in Manchester, this approach encouraged distributed
leadership by engendering recognition that meeting
the centralization programme’s goals, and those of
the stroke community, required a pan-London perspec-
tive. For instance, two clinical leaders in London
performed a visible symbolic role in supporting the pro-
posals, despite this meaning that their own services
would not become HASUs. In Manchester, programme
leaders’ weaker authority made encouraging distributed
leadership more diﬃcult, despite ‘support from the most
senior and most respected clinicians’ (stroke network
board member).
Rule 2: Establish feedback loops
This rule refers to the importance of measuring out-
comes that are trusted by stakeholders and incentiviz-
ing improvement. Performance data were collected in
both areas. In London, the designation process for
hospitals was linked to achieving standards, such as
minimum staﬀ numbers, meaning that providers had
to comply in order to be accredited. Providers also
received a ﬁnancial incentive for performing well, as
performance data were monitored by the stroke net-
works, and payments were only made if quality stand-
ards were met. In Manchester, a local payment system
was required to split the costs of providing services
between HASUs and SUs, although payments were
based on patients treated by each form of provider
not by achieving standards. Thus, ﬁnancial incen-
tives were stronger in London than Manchester for
improving clinical standards (in Manchester ﬁnancial
penalties were considered punitive by planners and
not used).
Rule 3: Attend to history
The Best framework suggests the importance of learn-
ing from previous transformation attempts, including
‘failures’. In London, past failures to achieve major
system change meant programme leaders focused on
implementing ‘a small number of absolute priorities’.
Change leaders were aware that dealing with stake-
holders’ diﬀerences was critical during planning meet-
ings: ‘not letting people go out the room if I thought
actually they were disagreeing but they weren’t disagree-
ing in the room’ (service commissioner).
In Manchester, decision-making based on unanimity
was preferred as historically collective decisions were
made by consensus among commissioners and pro-
viders. One programme leader believed that the
approach taken ‘introduced an awful lot of risk that we
needn’t have played into it’ (service commissioner).
In both areas, stroke network members’ experiences
of an earlier reorganization of acute cardiac services
was utilized. This highlighted a need to encourage dia-
logue between the ambulance service and other stake-
holders. In London, insistence by the ambulance service
informed the decision to take a big bang approach to
transformation whereby centralized services went live
6 Journal of Health Services Research & Policy 0(0)
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on a single date. Manchester’s ambulance service
expressed a similar preference, but a decision was
made to implement changes to services in stages
instead. A barrier to addressing the ambulance service’s
preference was the need to accommodate providers’
concerns about transferring patients in the new
system: ‘The worry was that if you suddenly changed
the system, the whole system, you could become com-
pletely overwhelmed’ (clinical lead).
Programme leaders attended to history by recogniz-
ing that the existing system was unlikely to be recep-
tive to change. In Manchester, programme leaders
attempted to overcome resistance by making decisions
through consensus. This involved bowing to resistance
from some providers and resulted in less radical trans-
formation. Conversely, the political authority with
which London’s programme leaders acted was critical
in being able to challenge resistance.
Rule 4: Engage physicians
This rule highlights the need to engage physicians as
they have historically had the power to inﬂuence
major system change.14 However, in practice, the
involvement of a wide range of stakeholders was
required. Ambulance services who assessed and trans-
ported the majority of patients with suspected stroke,
were critical: ‘it wouldn’t have happened if the ambulance
service hadn’t been fully on board with it’ (stroke
network board member).
Obtaining the agreement of hospitals’ senior man-
agement was necessary as changes to stroke provision
would aﬀect hospital income and other departments. In
Manchester, one hospital did not bid to become a
HASU, despite physician support, due to A&E pres-
sure: ‘senior management had told [the consultant] not
to, that the bid shouldn’t go in’ (clinical lead). The wider
ﬁnancial impact of full centralization was understood
by programme leaders. To meet both physicians’
and hospital managers’ expectations, the model for cen-
tralizing services needed to achieve ‘clinical consensus’
and be a viable ‘business proposal’ (stroke network
board member).
As well as aﬀecting stakeholders within health ser-
vices, change was aﬀected by local politics. In London,
the programme included establishing a committee of
local politicians to scrutinize the proposal’s public
interest. The implications of services being discontinued
in some areas caused resistance from local government
representatives: ‘issues which caused the most angst was
the removal of facilities from a certain local authority
area. Every elected councillor wants to protect their
area’ (local politician).
While stroke physicians were a key stakeholder, the
geographic scale and public interest in the changes
proposed meant that other stakeholders, both within
and outside the health service, needed to be engaged
to avoid derailment of change. Champions included
senior stroke physicians, who exerted social inﬂuence
over other clinicians as the Best framework suggests.
Rather than relying on physician engagement, success
was enabled through dialogue between, and the align-
ment of, diﬀerent stakeholders.
Rule 5: Involve patients and families
This rule suggests that change processes should include
service users’ perspectives and priorities. Attempts were
made to represent their views in both areas. For exam-
ple, patient organizations sat on committees for gov-
erning changes. Patients’ perceived priorities informed
other stakeholders’ decision-making. In London, the
initial pan-London proposal to centralize stroke care
underwent public consultation. As the majority of
respondents (67% of 3464) agreed with introducing
specialist centres,15 this was seen to justify implement-
ing a centralized model: ‘Our mandate for doing what we
were doing came from that public consultation in which
‘‘about seven’’ had been supported, and there were going
to be about seven’ (pan-regional health authority
member).
In Manchester, patients’ perceived needs were used
to reach consensus during decision-making about cen-
tralizing services. However, some interviewees doubted
whether service users’ views, while sought through con-
sultation on proposed service models, inﬂuenced trans-
formation: ‘I don’t think it really changed anything. . .
but at least people felt that they had a voice’ (service
user representative).
Patient and public views were used instrumentally by
leaders to lend support to the implementation of well-
deﬁned models of care. In London, as public support
for about seven specialist centres had been quantiﬁed,
this aided agreement to implement more fully centra-
lized services. Public involvement had a political dimen-
sion as engagement was structured by programme
leaders’ framing the options for consultation and the
choice of the outcomes to legitimize changes to services.
In Manchester, there was no equivalent process to
establish service users’ priorities.
Discussion
While services were more fully centralized in London, a
less radical transformation of services took place in
Manchester because programme leaders did not have
the political authority to challenge resistance from
some stakeholders. In Manchester, the original model
in which patients would be eligible for HASU care
within 24 h from onset of symptoms was revised so as
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to maintain consensus, such that only patients present-
ing within 4 h of developing symptoms were eligible for
treatment in a HASU and no provider lost their stroke
services. This contrasted with the model in London, in
which all patients with suspected stroke were eligible
for HASU treatment and stroke services were closed
in ﬁve providers.
The Best framework was useful for identifying key
processes in the transformation of stroke services, yet
produced an incomplete account of change. A need
exists for greater acknowledgement of: potential bar-
riers to implementing each rule; potential conﬂict
between rules in service planning; and, as others have
shown,16,17 the importance of politics in decision-
making concerning healthcare reorganization. Our sug-
gested changes to the rules are summarized in Table 2.
Distributed leadership by stroke physicians and
other stakeholders was apparent in both transform-
ations, but system leadership was necessary to capital-
ize on distributed leadership by aligning it with
transformation goals. This system designated leader-
ship in London encouraged distributed leadership by
aligning actors with a pan-London approach to
improvement. This eschewed commitment to sustaining
a given hospital’s acute stroke service, even those recog-
nized as providing high-quality care at the time.
Managing disparate stakeholder interests was easier
in London than in Manchester because designated
leaders exercised greater political authority through
pan-regional bodies and committees. This suggests
that system leadership with authority is necessary to
align multiple organizations across a large scale.
However, encouraging leadership throughout the
system is equally important; evidence from Denmark
has shown that implementing stroke service centraliza-
tion ‘top-down’ restricted the involvement of front-line
staﬀ and undermined ownership.18
Diﬀerences in the use of feedback loops in London
and Manchester highlight the importance of analysing
the social and political context in which performance
metrics are developed. Variation in responses to feed-
back can be explained partly by diﬀerences in how
resources were used to support transformation (e.g.
local quality standards were linked to ﬁnancial incen-
tives to a greater extent in London). As feedback loops
include social and ﬁnancial components, the expect-
ations of policy makers relying on social inﬂuence
alone to change behaviour may be blunted in some
contexts (e.g. where resources are already strained
and subject to competing demands).
In relation to attending to history, Best et al. showed
the diﬃculties associated with implementing such les-
sons. Analysis of political factors in the current study
shows that a potential barrier to applying lessons is the
involvement of multiple stakeholder interests in change;
accommodating these may thwart transformation. In
Manchester, the ambulance service provided advice
on the timing of implementation, but a barrier to
executing their recommendations was the need
to accommodate other stakeholders’ perspectives.
Proceeding on the basis of consensus may lessen resist-
ance to transformation but this approach produced less
radical change. The rule of attending to history, which
involves recognizing potential barriers to change, is
insuﬃcient for improving implementation. As demon-
strated in London, system leadership combined with
political authority that includes levers to ﬁnance and
performance manage major system change is needed
to challenge the existing context and enable
transformation.
The importance of involving a range of stakeholders
beyond physicians in major system change was illu-
strated. These changes necessitated engagement with a
range of clinical and managerial groups as planning
change involved clinical, ﬁnancial, logistical and
public interest considerations. In this case, privileging
the interests of one stakeholder was inappropriate, as
other groups could impede change, including ambu-
lance services, hospital managers and local authorities.
Public and patient involvement was used instrumen-
tally by programme leaders to demonstrate support for
the proposals being developed rather than to fulﬁl the
loftier aspiration of co-designed services, which is often
absent from major system change.1 One reason for this
is political; in both areas, a vision for transformed ser-
vices was already well deﬁned and programme leaders
focused more on gaining public support for the service
models stemming from this vision than on obtaining
patients’ input into service design (such as identifying
performance metrics from patients’ perspectives). This
resonates with previous research showing that patient
and public involvement is often guided by health pro-
fessionals, especially where technical knowledge is
deemed necessary to participate.19 Only considering
involvement in relation to fulﬁlling a change pro-
gramme’s needs neglects the reasons for, and impact
of, involvement from the perspective of service
users.20 Furthermore, rules may conﬂict with one
another in this context. Engaging clinicians to pursue
a clinical case for change may have implications for
involving the public in service design, as their views
may not coincide.
Analysis of politics and power explains how diﬀerent
forms of leadership are combined in major system
change. In both areas, providers and commissioners
were consulted extensively on the new model for
stroke care proposed. In London, change leaders had
the political authority to maintain their position in
response to providers’ concerns. In Manchester, leaders
had less political authority and focused on maintaining
8 Journal of Health Services Research & Policy 0(0)
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consensus among stakeholders but in so doing imple-
mented a less radical transformation. The two models
were later found to have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent impact
on stroke mortality and the provision of evidence-based
clinical interventions.5,21 The more radical transform-
ation of services in London involved system authority
structures (the pan-regional health authority) combined
with senior clinical leadership who used persuasive
arguments. Although change in Manchester also
involved clinical leadership, weaker authority struc-
tures existed for aligning stakeholders.
Conclusion
The combination of bottom-up leadership and top-
down coordination of major system change is vital in
navigating the complex process of its implementation.
Engaging local stakeholders in planning is important to
ensure that change builds on their experiences, is rele-
vant to their needs, and motivates staﬀ.22 However, as
multiple stakeholders are often involved, a coordinat-
ing body with political authority to bring together
those diﬀerent interests is needed. System leadership –
underpinned with the political authority to align stake-
holders – should assume a leading role in supporting
innovation by coordinating change.
Since the transformations of stroke care were imple-
mented, pan-regional health authorities have been abol-
ished and many purchasing and performance
management duties in England have been transferred
to local commissioning consortia.23 Policy makers
should reﬂect critically on the collective capacity these
organizations, and the providers from which they pur-
chase services, have to pursue major system change.
More recently, proposals have been announced to
devolve budgets and decision-making authority back
up to regions, notably Manchester.24 In relation to
these diﬀerent approaches to decision-making, policy
makers should consider how system structures can be
used to enable the joint planning and implementation of
major system change. Finally, against a background of
austerity, where many health systems face ﬁnancial pres-
sure, some ‘rules’ may need to be prioritized over others.
Formative research could explore the feasibility of using
an explicit framework of rules to inform programme
leaders’ decision-making about allocating resources to
the activities signiﬁed by each ‘rule’ and highlight per-
ceived barriers and enablers to their use in change.
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